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Babies, Parks, and Citizen Dissatisfaction
Social Protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey and their Long-term Effects
Abstract
2013 was a year of social unrest in the regions of the Mediterranean and 
southeastern Europe. From Bulgaria to Slovenia, and from Egypt to Syria, there 
were new waves of citizen unrest, violent clashes, and civil-war-like escalations. 
This paper looks at the social protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. 
The protests in the two countries started because of concrete examples of public 
mismanagement: In the case of Bosnia because of the failure to pass a new law 
on identity numbers, which resulted in the inability of a baby to receive medical 
support abroad, and in the case of Turkey because of the decision to replace 
Gezi Park with a new shopping centre in Istanbul. However, both protests are 
also symbolic of deeper sentiments of citizen dissatisfaction. What started out 
as protests to save a park in Turkey, and change the law on identity numbers in 
Bosnia, became a wider movement to demand substantial reforms and changes 
to the current style of politics in both countries. This paper will look at the 
long-term effects of these protests. While in the short-term they have resulted 
in relatively few changes, it will be demonstrated that there might be long-term 
effects that will signiicantly impact the social contract in Bosnia and Turkey.  
Keywords: Bosnia, Turkey, citizen dissatisfaction, social protest
1. Introduction
The summer of 2013 saw civil unrest in most countries of southeastern Europe. From 
Slovenia to Greece, from Croatia to Bulgaria, a pattern of protest emerged in which citizens 
publically demonstrated against their governments, economic mismanagement, and wider 
societal inequality. Protests also took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina1 and Turkey. In both 
countries, the underlying issue is discontent with the system, and the struggle for basic 
public and common goods for all is the transparent progressive content of the protests. While 
various catalysts motivated people from different backgrounds to take to the streets against 
their government, the consequences levied by security forces saw those citizens joining 
forces to protest government actions. The long-term effects of these movements are yet 
to be determined, but whether the protests are ongoing, as in Turkey, or have faded (with 
questionable effect), as in Bosnia, a legacy will undoubtedly remain that solidarity, passion, 
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1 Henceforth, the short form ‘Bosnia’ will be used to indicate the country’s full name. 
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and a common cause can create a movement willing to challenge existing political systems. 
It is these long-term consequences that we are interested in and will discuss in this paper. In 
doing so, we irst outline the history of the recent protests and their original motivation and 
then explore the wider background of the social unrest in these countries. In the last section, 
we discuss the long-term effects on the nations’ political systems. 
2. The Start of Protests in Bosnia and Turkey 
In Turkey, protests began in May 2013 out of peaceful demonstrations against a government-
backed plan to demolish Gezi Park (a section of Taksim Square in central Istanbul) to build a 
shopping mall. At the time of this writing, there have been six deaths attributed to the protests, 
and the Turkish Medical Association has reported that more than 8,000 people have been 
injured at demonstrations, while thousands of civilians, lawyers, and journalists have been 
imprisoned.2 The strong police crackdown on those demonstrations spawned widespread 
anger in Turkey, with hundreds of thousands of people taking to the streets on May 31. 
Although triggered by the Gezi Park incidents, the unrest developed into a broader protest 
against Prime Minister Erdogan’s autocratic authoritarianism and didactic conservatism. 
Turkey’s constitution states that it is a secular democratic country, but Erdogan’s critics warn 
of his lack of concern over democracy in favour of an Islamist agenda, moving Turkey away 
from the West and closer to the Middle East. 
Over time, the nature of the protests in Turkey has changed, with mass demonstrations 
being supplemented by acts of public deiance and civil disobedience. The most recent 
protests began following the death of Ahmet Atakan, a 22-year-old man who died at a rally 
opposing the construction of a road that would cause environmental damage to the grounds 
of Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara.3 The oficial statement claims that Atakan 
fell from a building, but opposition sources say he died when he was struck by a police gas 
canister. This event sparked a fresh wave of protests nationally, lasting for days and resulting 
in further clashes with security forces.  
 In Bosnia, citizens from both entities4 came together to demonstrate their discontent 
with the political system. The country’s baby revolution (Bebolucija) is so named because 
the consequence of the latest political stalemate affects babies born after February 12, 2013. 
These children are not being allocated their oficial identity number (known by its acronym, 
JMBG), without which, among other things, they are unable to obtain a passport.5 Bosnian 
Serb representatives demanded that the new ID numbers relect the country’s two entities: the 
Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republika Srpska. Bosniak and Croat representatives, 
however, did not agree, and both sides refused to compromise. Protests began on June 5, 2013, 
when the plight of a three-month-old girl who was restricted from travelling to Germany for 
medical treatment spread on social media. 
Reacting to the story of baby Belmina, a group of citizens gathered in front of the 
2 “Report on the Assessment of Health Problems in Persons Exposed to Chemical Riot Control Agents,” Turkish Medical 
Association (TTB), 2013, www.ttb.org.tr/kutuphane/kimyasalgosteri_en.pdf.
3 “Anti-Government Protester dies in Turkey,” AP News, September 10 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/anti-government-
protester-dies-turkey. 
4 Bosnia is a federal country consisting of two entities (The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska 
(RS)) and the District of Brčko. On Bosnian federalism see: S. Keil, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Farnham 
and Burlington: Ashgate, 2013). 
5 “Bosnia Protests over legal void over newborn documents,” Global Post, June 10 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/
news/afp/130610/bosnia-protests-legal-void-over-newborn-documents.
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parliament building to protest. They decided not to move until politicians found a solution 
to the problem. Within days, 3,000 protesters had formed a human chain around Parliament, 
refusing to allow parliamentarians, politicians, or foreign dignitaries from leaving until a new 
law had been adopted, or until, as they said, politicians inally did the job they were paid to 
do.6 The protests intensiied upon the news of the death of a baby who needed treatment in 
Serbia but was unable to cross the border to receive it.7 Again, it took only days for citizens 
to react, and protests erupted in all major cities in Bosnia. Students protested in Sarajevo and 
in the Republika Srpska’s administrative centre (Banja Luka) against an ineficient university 
system and the dificult conditions of student life. Citizens also gathered in Banja Luka in 
support of a man who had been evicted from his property and beaten by police in an incident 
related to plans to destroy a public park to build a shopping mall – much like the Gezi Park 
situation in Turkey. 
The reaction to the failure to resolve the JMBG issue has been said to relect the 
ongoing frustrations of Bosnian citizens with the political elites. The lack of cooperation in 
parliament leads to political deadlock around most legislative issues; the Bosnian political 
and administrative system costs the country around two-thirds of its budget and consistently 
fails to deliver results.8 To replace the ethnic divisions set out in the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement (which ended nearly four years of war in the country) opposition parties have 
called for a new constitution that would relect the rights of all citizens as equals.
The protests in Turkey and Bosnia developed through spontaneous action, without being 
led by one main group or organiser. Social media played a vital role in the organisation of 
these protests, and the coordination of the protestors. Different opposition parties and groups 
tried to utilize the protests to push their own agenda, but failed to do so effectively in both 
countries.  
3. The Wider Picture of Social Unrest in Bosnia and Turkey
In Turkey, the 2013 protests have been loosely coordinated through Twitter hashtags and 
Facebook pages, and there has been no evidence that the movement has resulted in an increase 
in electoral support for certain opposition parties, who tried to use the protests for their own 
political agendas. Indeed, it appears that the lack of faith in any political party is one of the 
main reasons protesters took to the streets in the irst place, along with general dissatisfaction 
within some elements of Turkish society (such as the secular elite who have become more 
and more estranged from the AKP government (Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi, or Justice and 
Development Party; JDP) and Prime Minister Erdogan’s increasingly arbitrary and autocratic 
style. This strong public opposition to the government has been provoked by the following 
factors: Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conlict – which has led to terrorist attacks in 
Turkey; legislative attempts to restrict freedom of behaviour – such as recent restrictions 
on the sale of alcohol; and liberal economic and investment policies that ignore social and 
environmental matters – despite a strong tradition in Turkey of leftist and ‘green’ movements.
6  Tamara Gocmanac, “Thousands are Joining Bosnia’s Babylution,” Global Voice, June 20, 2013, http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2013/06/20/babylution/.
7  E. Dedovic, “Bosnia’s baby revolution: is the protest movement coming of age?” Open Democracy, June 26, 2013, http://
www.opendemocracy.net/edin-dedovic/bosnia%E2%80%99s-baby-revolution-is-protest-movement-coming-of-age.
8  On Bosnia’s over-federalized and over-institutionalized system and the political consequences, see: B. Bahtic-Kunrath, “Of 
Veto Players and Entity-Voting: Institutional Gridlock in the Bosnian Reform Process,” Nationalities Papers 39, no.6 (November 
2011): 899-923.
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In Bosnia, the demonstrations also evolved through citizen movements, and were not 
organised by a political party. At the beginning of the protests in June 2013, there was real 
potential for a social movement to emerge that could have counterbalanced the ethnic divides 
preserved by the institutions adopted in the Dayton Peace Agreement. Most protesters were 
Bosniak residents of Sarajevo, but demonstrators were not using national slogans, and groups 
from the Republika Srpska and Zagreb also joined the protest in Sarajevo. The possible threat 
to the country’s nationalist parties saw the political elites adopt the familiar ‘divide-and-rule’ 
tactic – Croat and Serb MPs attempted to portray the protests as hostile actions waged by 
Bosniaks against their fellow citizens (Serbs and Croats), which proves the need to preserve 
the autonomy of the constituent peoples in the country’s political system. Serbian politicians 
declared that the protests were “anti-Serb” in nature and manipulated by Bosniak parties, 
and the president of that entity talked about “the biggest hostage crisis” while the Bosniak 
member of the tripartite presidency called upon protesters to show their discontent at the next 
elections.9 While there was a momentum to create a stronger social movement, this has now 
faded, and is unlikely to happen. In November 2013 the Bosnian Parliament adopted a new 
law on identity numbers, which will not only contribute to further ethnic divisions, but also 
ignored the demands of the protestors for identity numbers that are neutral and do not identify 
a person’s place of birth or ethnicity.10  
The nationalist rhetoric used by politicians to retain support was being openly questioned 
and opposed by citizens willing to gather across divisions and protest against the system 
as a whole. The Bebolucija movement suffered because of its determination to remain 
independent from any party, according to Dennis Gratz (president of the multi-ethnic party 
Naša Stranka), who believes the protesters were playing a “dangerous game” by compounding 
all parties into one target, leaving their group detached, isolated, and powerless.11 However, 
by preventing citizens from gaining access to the basic citizenship right of a registration 
number, ethno-nationalists provoked an unexpected reaction: they provided citizens with 
a common enemy by giving political meaning to what they strived to destroy – namely the 
common citizenship of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians. The chances of success for this 
civic movement to inluence the political system, however, was always questioned by those 
who see the institutional system designed by the Dayton Agreement as effectively paralysing 
political life on ethnic grounds. 
The international community, which was instrumental in designing the Dayton Agreement, 
also played an important role in the 2013 protests. Two days after the protest began, High 
Representative (HR) Valentin Inzko demanded that protesters remove the blockade on the 
parliament building, promising that the issue would be discussed at an urgently convened 
meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an international body that oversees 
the country’s peace process.12 Meanwhile, concerns about the current structure in Bosnia 
have been raised in the European Union (EU). The ineficient political system and resulting 
9  Igor Štiks, “We are all in this together: A Civic Awakening in Bosnia Herzegovina,” Open Democracy, June 12, 2013,http://
www.opendemocracy.net/igor-%C5%A0tiks/%E2%80%98we-are-all-in-this-together%E2%80%99-civic-awakening-in-bosnia-
herzegovina. 
10  M. Zuvela, “Bosnia Passes ID Law, Ending Row that Cost a Baby’s Life,” Reuters, November 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/11/05/us-bosnia-identity-idUSBRE9A40SG20131105.
11  Rodolfo Toè, “Bebolujica: Spring Delayed,” Open Democracy, July 16, 2013, http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-
and-countries/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/Bebolucija-spring-delayed-138840#.UeecAMRIvTE.twitter.
12  The High Representative is the highest civilian authority in Bosnia. The position is legitimized by the Dayton Peace Accords 
and has received extensive imposition and removal powers by the PIC. The PIC and the HR also regularly report to the UN.
59
Babies, Parks, and...
administrative inertia, especially at the central level, has given rise to public dissatisfaction 
and widespread criticism. The division of the country based on ethnic criteria affects the 
voting system and discriminates against citizens of other ethnic backgrounds. Due to this, 
EU Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Fule stated that the EU will only recognise the 
results of the parliamentary elections scheduled for Spring 2014 on the condition that the 
constitution be amended to address a vital judgement of the European Court of Human Rights 
in 2009.13
The international community has not been impressed with Erdogan’s reaction towards 
Turkey’s protesters: the United Nations (UN), the United States (US), and other Western 
partners have voiced concern about the heavy-handed police action. A report published by 
Amnesty International accused Turkish authorities of committing human rights abuses “on a 
massive scale” while trying to quell the uprisings.14 The report stated that Turkish riot squads 
ired enormous amounts of tear gas, often at close range in conined spaces, and used other 
types of disproportionate force in their tactics to crush protests in Istanbul, Ankara, and other 
cities. The rights group cited the evidence compiled by the Turkish Medical Association 
regarding the more than 8,000 injuries, attributed to tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons, 
beatings, and live ammunition. Erdogan’s government defended what it called the right of 
police to use tear gas and water cannons against protests by groups that undermine public 
order.15
Although Erdoğan is unlikely to sever Turkey’s ties with its traditional allies in Europe or 
with the US, those relationships are likely to come under considerable strain. An increase in 
the already-rocky relations between Turkey and the EU could prove particularly problematic 
at a time when the negotiating process for Turkish accession has been postponed until the 
progress report on Turkey’s EU reform credentials has been assessed. This situation could 
also affect Turkish-US relations regarding Syria, where NATO-member Turkey is a key 
regional ally for the US and has, thus far, backed it in opposing President Bashar al-Assad. 
4. The Long-Term Effects of the Protests
It has become clear in recent weeks that the protests in Bosnia and Turkey have had very 
little short-term effect on politics in those countries. While a new law on ID numbers was 
passed in Bosnia, it did not take into account any of the protesters’ concerns. In Turkey, the 
destruction of Gezi Park has begun and Prime Minister Erdoğan remains in power. Neither 
the short-term demands for a new, ethnically-neutral law on ID numbers in Bosnia nor the 
protection of Gezi Park in Istanbul has been successfully achieved, and the long-term issues 
of a more authoritarian conservative Erdoğan and a divided political system in Bosnia have 
also not been addressed.  
Yet these protests, and those in neighbouring nations, have demonstrated that there is 
general dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy and economic organisation in these 
countries. The well-known Slovene Philosopher Slavoj Žižek and others have pointed to a 
global crisis characterised by a general apathy towards some of the side effects of free-market 
13  D. Sito-Sucic, “Bosnia Risks Seeing EU Path “Frozen” Without Further Reform,” Reuters, April 11, 2013, available at: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/11/us-bosnia-eu-idUSBRE93A0L220130411. 
14  Turkey: Gezi Park protests: Brutal denial of the right to peaceful assembly in Turkey,” Amnesty International, October 2013, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/022/2013/en.
15  R. Gladstone, “Rights Group Accuses Turkish Police of Excessive Force against Protestors,” The New York Times, June 12, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/world/europe/rights-groups-accuse-turkish-police-of-excessive-force-against-protesters.
html?_r=0.
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capitalism.16 In this context, it is important to note that the protests in Bosnia and Turkey 
crossed important societal divides. While the irst demonstrators in Bosnia were Bosniaks 
in Sarajevo, they were soon joined by Croats and Serbs from other parts of the country. In 
Turkey, young and leftist protesters irst went to the streets to voice their opposition to the 
destruction of Gezi Park. They were soon joined by older protestors from all social classes, 
and also by those that would otherwise support the ruling AKP. These two issues – a baby and 
a park – were able to bridge important divides that have been key markers of these respective 
societies in the last decades. They managed to unite people from different class, political, 
and geographical backgrounds, and provide a platform on which to discuss not only the 
questions of ID cards and Istanbul’s green space, but also the political systems in Bosnia and 
Turkey. Moreover, the protests were able to cross party lines, and while opposition parties 
tried to participate and instrumentalise the protests in both countries, they largely failed to 
do so because the protestors refused to join them. While this is a remarkable development 
in political systems where parties dominate parliamentary representation and government 
selection, in the long term it remains to be seen whether the protesters’ demands will be 
addressed and their voiced concerns will ind political representation in systems based on 
parties and their representatives. 
In Turkey, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s response to the protests may have damaged his long-
term plans. His support may have been affected by his comments that branded the hundreds 
of thousands who took to the streets in cities across the country as an “extremist fringe” and 
“a bunch of looters.”17 In stark contrast, Turkish President Abdullah Gül called for a calm 
reaction by government and defended protesters’ rights to hold peaceful demonstrations. 
Erdoğan has been seeking to push through controversial constitutional reforms that would 
increase the power of the presidency, a position he is seeking in the 2014 election, and which, 
after winning three landslide elections as prime minister, he had seemed well placed to win. 
However, Erdoğan’s harsh comments, the heavy response of Turkish security forces to the 
demonstrators, and Erdoğan’s decision to leave the country for foreign visits during the 
unrest, thus absolving himself of responsibility for resolving it, has seen Gül’s popularity 
rise. Gül will be running for president again in 2014, and what will happen in that election is 
anyone’s guess; even the possibility of an AKP split cannot be excluded.
Erdoğan’s recent announcement in Istanbul of his much-anticipated “democratization 
package” was met with a cool reception domestically and at the EU level.18 Many minority 
groups feel continued frustration at the lack of equal rights and representation, and Amnesty 
International says the package fails to address the authorities’ violations during the 2013 
protests and lacks any assurances that similar incidents will not occur in the future. Although 
many EU leaders have been critical of the overuse of force by police against protesters, the 
most recent progress report of the European Commission views the democratization package 
and some of the reforms Turkey implemented by after the height of the protests in June 2013 
as positive signs of internal democratization.19 The EU has agreed to open another chapter 
16  S. Žižek, “Trouble in Paradise,” London Review of Books 35, no.14 (July 2013): 11-12.
17  R. Sherlock, “Turkey: Erdogan brands protesters ‘extremists’ and ‘looters,’” The Telegraph, June 3, 2013, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10096762/Turkey-Erdogan-brands-protesters-extremists-and-looters.html. 
18  “Erdoğan’s Democracy Package gets cool reception,” Al Monitor, September 30, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2013/09/Erdoğan-democracy-package-reception-cool.html#
19  Turkey 2013 Progress Report, European Commission, Brussels, October 16, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013.pdf .
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with Turkey, but the country’s prospects are worse than ever. While German and French 
conservatives have focused on Turkey’s Islamic tradition to veto its membership in the 
EU, they can now also point towards its lack of democratic credentials and a stronger push 
towards authoritarianism. In fact, it could be argued that the lack of EU engagement in and 
with Turkey in recent years has been partially to blame for the undoing of some important 
reforms that were implemented in the early 2000s, when Erdoğan irst came to power. 
Turkish relations with the US are also at issue. While Erdoğan will not risk a break, his re-
orientation and authoritarian style has alienated many in Washington. It has become clear that 
Turkish foreign policy is being reshaped, and the recent low in Turkey-Egypt relations20 is an 
example of the failure of the country’s zero-problems-with-neighbours policy that aimed at 
establishing Turkey as a regional power. 
When, during the height of the protests, Erdoğan organised a counter-protest outside 
Istanbul in which tens of thousands of AKP and Erdoğan supporters participated, he 
demonstrated that he is not afraid of further conlict. This evidence has further deepened 
the divisions between those who support traditional Atatürk-style secularism and those who 
favour a more-conservative public sphere, where Islam plays a more-prominent role. And 
while Erdoğan is not trying to turn Turkey into a second Iran, he is attacking some of the 
fundamental pillars of Turkish society. He does so with the support of a large part of the 
population, mainly (but not exclusively) from Anatolia, the lower and middle classes, and 
rural areas. Those who have supported (and proited from) the long tradition of Kemalism, 
that is, the higher classes, societal elites, the judiciary, and most notably, the army, ind 
themselves in a new position, and it remains to be seen whether Turkish democracy and civil 
society are strong enough to address these deep cleavages within a democratic framework.  
In Bosnia, the domestic political scene remains dominated by ethnically exclusive parties. 
Their leaders focus more on their own interests than on what is best for the country. Little 
change can be expected in the 2014 general elections, as a system along ethnic lines favours 
those who radically promote the beneits of their own group. While the unrest must have 
scared some of these elites, its quick cool-down after June 2013 will have calmed those 
who saw their positions in danger. With ongoing discussions on constitutional reform, which 
allow for a focus on particular interests and ethnic divisions, it is unlikely that any long-term 
change will emerge out of the summer unrest. Yet these protests were by no means in vain. For 
the irst time, there has been a movement of people crossing ethnic, party, and societal lines, 
and who voiced their opposition to their current elites and their political practices of vetoes 
and blockades. Public outrage about a system that favours a small minority and discriminates 
against the rest has become vocal; people have stopped suffering in silence. Other issues, 
such as a lack of progress in EU integration, further economic downturn due to Croatia’s 
membership in the EU, or other important unresolved political issues (for example, a return 
to visas as a result of the incapability of Bosnian elites to establish eficient anti-corruption 
bodies) may spark further unrest because citizens’ general consensus is that the Bosnian 
system has broken down (more so than in Turkey). People want change, but it remains to be 
seen how they will next articulate their desire for reform. 
The international community, in particular the EU, would do well to support non-
20  “Egypt Expels Turkish Ambassador,” BBC News, November 23,  2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-25066115. 
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governmental organizations and citizen associations in Bosnia in their quest for a more-
eficient and more-open political system. However, as long as the EU keeps supporting those 
parties that have been opposed and blamed by the protesters for their lack of decision-making, 
little can be expected in terms of public support for the EU in Bosnia, and in terms of progress 
for the country’s EU integration, which has substantially slowed down since Bosnia signed 
a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008. Bosnia needs a fundamental 
reform, and one in which citizens play a major role. 
From the situations in Bosnia, Turkey, and other countries in recent years, it has become 
apparent that citizens are willing to take their dissatisfaction to the streets. The political systems 
of Turkey and Bosnia, although formally democracies, have shown themselves unable to cope 
with public unrest except by declaring it illegitimate. This situation demonstrates how the 
elites of these countries have not internalized some of the most important elements of a civic 
culture and an established democracy; they apparently believe that democracy happens once 
every few years through the election ballot. Yet citizens and their acceptance of the political 
system are fundamental in a democratic system. The basic deinition of democracy as “rule 
by the people” remains of key importance. Bosnia, Turkey, and many other countries in the 
region (including those affected by the ‘Arab Spring’) demonstrate that when institutional 
mechanisms to voice citizen dissatisfaction fail (for example, because there are no free and 
fair elections, or because a government is becoming more authoritarian and less willing to 
compromise and ind consensus), then people will take their dissatisfaction to the streets. In 
democratic political systems, the right to protest, as well as the right to strike and the right 
to free expression are fundamental values and often enshrined within wider human rights 
provisions. Ignoring them can lead to long-term dissatisfaction not just with certain elites or 
parties, but with complete systems. If there is anything that we can learn from the breakdown 
of communism in the 1990s and from the Arab Spring, it is that citizen dissatisfaction can 
lead to massive changes in the long run.21 Political elites in Bosnia and Turkey would do well 
to recognise the value of a dialogue with citizens and the value of addressing their demands. 
Otherwise, although the unrest may have been quelled for a time, it will likely rise again, and 
perhaps transform in nature, possibly including more-violent clashes, and more-widespread 
unrest in both countries in the near future.
21  A good example of such reform is the Solidarity movement in Poland, which became a driving force of change in the early 
1980s, and persisted for nearly 10 years, until Communism fell and free elections occurred. 
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